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discretion. 9 The Hood decision is a sound one. It not only serves the best
interests of the medical community and the general public by encouraging
innovative treatments and procedures, but, it also protects the patient from
imprudent practitioners. Texas physicians who persist in following outmoded methods of treatment should therefore take notice that safety in
numbers does not apply to malpractice cases.
Rand J. Riklin

MINES AND MINERALS-Mineral Reservation-Surface
Owner Must Establish That, at the Time the Instrument
Was Executed. Removal of a Near-Surface Substance
Would Have Destroyed the Land Surface Before a
Mineral Reservation Is Construed to Exclude
That Substance

Reed v. Wylie,
554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
On September 30, 1950, W.C. Wylie and his wife Iva conveyed to James
F. Baker approximately 224 acres of land in Freestone County, Texas. The
deed reserved to the grantors a one-fourth undivided interest in "all oil,
gas and other minerals on and under the land," and the right to reasonable
use of the surface for mining operations. Baker's interest in the property
was subsequently acquired by Bette Reed, Trustee, a co-partnership. Reed
filed suit against Wylie, seeking a declaratory judgment to determine
whether the reservation in the 1950 deed entitled defendant to a one-fourth
interest in coal and lignite in the land. Reed moved for summary judgment
on the basis of an affidavit, which stated that coal and lignite on the
property could be extracted only by techniques which would substantially
damage the surface. In granting the motion, the trial court declared the
plaintiff to be the owner of all coal and lignite that could be removed from
the land by open pit and strip mining methods. Defendant appealed and
the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, holding that proof was
inadequate to support a summary judgment.' Both parties sought writ of
49. See Rickett v. Hayes, 511 S.W,2d 187, 194-95 (Ark. 1974) (physician not liable for
following one of several possible modes of treatment where there is an honest difference of
opinion among competent physicians); Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967)
(physician entitled to wide range in exercise of his judgment in treatment of heart disease).
1. Wylie v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d ;36, 189 (Tex. C'i.
169 (Tex. 1977).
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error in the Texas Supreme Court. Defendant Wylie urged a reexamination
of the rule announced in Acker v. Guinn' and challenged its application
by the lower court to the reservation in question. Held-Affirmed. A surface owner must establish that, at the time the instrument was executed,
removal of a near-surface substance would have substantially destroyed
the land surface before a mineral reservation is construed to exclude that
substance.'
At common law, fee simple ownership of real property embraced both
the surface of the land and the subsurface minerals in place.' The fee,
however, could be divided horizontally, either by a grant of the minerals
by the owner of the land, or by a grant of the land excepting or reserving
the minerals.5 Such a severance resulted in the creation of a mineral estate
that was separate and independent from the estate in the surface.' Thereafter, the surface estate was servient to the mineral estate for purposes of
exploration and production, subject only to a duty on the part of the
mineral owner to exercise his right of reasonable use with due regard for
the rights of the surface owner.'
2. 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
3. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977).
4. Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55,
60 (1898); accord. Winter v. Mackie; 135 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Mich. 1965) (right to sell or lease
oil, gas and minerals in soil is incident to fee simple ownership); see Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. 1974); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 37,
344 S.W.2d 411, 419 (1961). See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 202,
at 20 (1975).
5. See Hagar v. Stakes, 116 Tex. 453, 471, 294 S.W. 835, 842 (1927); Humphreys-Mexia
Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 255-56, 254 S.W. 296, 299 (1923); Perkins v. Kemp, 274 S.W.2d
892, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ refrd n.r.e.). See generally Stanton, Recent
Developments in the Construction of Mineral and Royalty Grants and Reservations,
PROCEEDINGS

OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION AS IT

AFFECTS THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 301 (1956)

(owner of mineral interest can either produce

oil and gas at own expense, or convey such rights to another by mineral lease).
6. See, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971); Slack v. Magee Heirs, 252
S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952), aff'd, 152 Tex. 427, 258 S.W.2d 797 (1953);
Norsworthy v. Hewgley, 234 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, writ refld). For
an excellent discussion of the respective rights and duties of surface and mineral owners upon
severance of land by grant or reservation see Walker, Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas
in Texas, 6 TEXAS L. REv. 125, 128-30 (1928).

7. General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1961) (pollu-

tion of underground water supply by mineral owner's negligent disposal of salt water constitutes breach of duty to surface owner); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 469,
271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954) (oil lessee owes duty to surface owner not to intentionally or
wantonly injure his cattle); Carter v. Simmons, 178 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1944. no writ) (maintenance of slush pits, flow tanks and storage tanks is reasonable and
necessary use of surface in oil operations); accord, Sun Oil Co. v. Nunnery, 170 So. 2d 24, 29
(Miss. 1964) (reasonable use includes clearance of land surface for drilling operations); Pure
Oil Co. v. Gear, 83 P.2d 389, 392 (Okla. 1938) (reasonable use extends to erection of salt water
storage tanks on surface). See also Comment, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Surface
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Where ownership of a particular substance has not been specifically
allowed or prohibited by the terms of a conveyance, a question arises
whether that substance is included in the grant or reservation of
"minerals."' Under the four corners rule, a court must ascertain the intention of the parties from the language used in the deed.' Furthermore,
extrinsic evidence of circumstances which surrounded its execution is not
admissible in the absence of an ambiguity on the face of the instrument. 0
Nevertheless, various rules of construction have been utilized by the Texas
courts to arrive at the intent of the parties concerning ownership of a
specific substance as a matter of law."
Several decisions have interpreted a grant or reservation of minerals to
include all substances "legally cognizable" as minerals, in the absence of
terms in the instrument to the contrary.'" On the other hand, the doctrine
of ejusdem generis 3 has been employed in a number of cases, although
Mining on the Severed Estate-A Legislative Proposal, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 140, 144
(1975).
8. Northern P. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 529 (1903). The Supreme Court stated:
"The word 'mineral' is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary
definitions of the dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a given case."
Id. at 530; see, e.g., Frostad v. Kitchens, 377 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 1967) (gravel not included
in mineral reservation); Carson v. Missouri P. Ry., 209 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ark. 1948) (reservation
of "all coal and mineral deposits" held not to include bauxite); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d
915, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ) (lease of "all" minerals included
uranium). Recently, several cases have held that coal was included in a grant or reservation
of minerals. See Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 551 (N.D. 1973) (lignite coal was
included in reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals"); Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844,
856 (N.D. 1972). But see Wulf v. Schultz, 508 P.2d 896, 900 (Kan. 1973) (coal not included
in a grant of "other mineral substances"); River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources,
331 So. 2d 878, 882 (La. Ct. of App.), writ ref'd per curiam, 337 So. 2d 221 (La. 1976). See
generally Maxwell, The Meaning of "Minerals"-The Relationship of Interpretationand
Surface Burden, 8 Tzx. TECH L. REv. 255 (1976).
9. E.g., Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d 800,
805 (1940); Colquitt v. Eureka Producing Co., 63 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933,
judgmt adopted); Chandler v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ
refd n.r.e.); accord, Rogers v. Morgan, 164 So. 2d 480, 484 (Miss. 1964); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Beach, 436 P.2d 107, 110 (N.M. 1968).
10. E.g., Texas Elec. Ry. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 534, 252 S.W.2d 451, 456 (1952);
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Sugarland Indus., 137 Tex. 409, 421, 153 S.W.2d 477, 483 (1941);
Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940).
See also I E. KuNTrz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 16.1, at 371 (1962).
11. Comment, Surface or Mineral: A Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 407, 408 (1971).
12. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ refd).
The Austin Court of Civil Appeals defined the term "legally cognizable" as being "restricted
to such minerals and mineral substances as are commonly regarded as minerals as distinguished from the soil in general." Id. at 660-61; accord, Maynard v. McHenry, 113 S.W.2d
13, 14 (Ky. 1938). See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.-983 (1933).
13. In Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ refd),
the rule of ejusdem generis was stated as follows: "[wihere there is an enumeration of
particular things, followed by general words, the latter shall be construed as having reference
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there have been difficulties inherent in its application to mineral deeds."
Generally, however, Texas courts have construed the term "minerals" according to its natural and ordinary meaning, and have applied that standard to determine ownership of a certain substance under a grant or reservation of minerals.

5

The increased use of surface mining as an economical alternative to
underground mining provided a major impetus for the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Acker v. Guinn." In Acker it was held that a grant or
reservation of "minerals" would not be considered to include a substance
that must be removed by methods that would substantially impair a surface estate for agricultural and grazing purposes. 7 Subsequently, the Waco
Court of Civil Appeals in Williford v. Spies" applied the surface destruction test promulgated in Acker, holding that coal would not pass to the
mineral estate under a conveyance of "oil, gas and other minerals."' The
court reasoned that the parties to the conveyance could not have intended
to define "minerals" as a substance which had to be removed by methods
that would destroy the surface estate, in the absence of an intention affirmatively expressed in the instrument containing the grant or reservation."
to things only of the same kind and class with those specifically mentioned.
... Id. at 1098;
see, e.g., Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex. 94, 103, 157 S.W.
737, 739-40 (1913); Guinn v. Acker, 451 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), aff'd,
464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord,. Wulf v. Schultz, 508 P.2d 896, 901-02
(Kan. 1973); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So. 2d 384, 388 (Miss. 1954).
14. In Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd)
the court rejected the ejusdem generis rule because it could not determine whether the form,
color, weight, use, density or value of a particular substance should serve as the basis of
classification in its application to a coal reservation. Id. at 1099. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota refused to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis to exclude coal from
the term "other minerals" because of the numerous similarities between coal and oil and gas.
Christman v..Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973); see Comment, Is Coal Included in
a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals?", 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 490-91 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949); Atwood v.
Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Eldridge v.
Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
17. Id. at 352. The Acker court specifically stated that it was not basing its opinion on
the ejusdem generis rule, which was in keeping with its previous decisions on this point. Id.
at 350; cf. Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964)
(doctrine of ejusdem generis as applied to minerals has not been accepted in Texas). See also
Patton, Recent Changes in the CorrelativeRights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 RoCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19, 21-26 (1973).
18. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
19. Id. at 131.
20. Id. at 129-30. Since no such intention was expressed, the Williford court decided that
the coal and lignite belonged to the surface estate. Id. at 131; see Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d
348, 352 (Tex. 1971). See also Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil,
Gas, or Other Minerals?", 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 488 (1976).
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In Reed v. Wylie2 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a substance passed as a mineral under a grant or reservation, when such substance could either be extracted by strip mining methods which would
destroy the surface estate, or by techniques which would not deplete the
land surface. 2 In affirming its decision in Acker the majority opinion held
that before a mineral reservation will be construed to exclude a nearsurface substance, the surface owner must prove that, at the time the instrument was eiecuted, removal of the substance would have destroyed
the surface of the land. 3 The court reasoned that destruction of the surface by the mineral owner was not ordinarily within the general intent of
the parties to a mineral conveyance, and therefore, a near-surface substance could not have been contemplated in the reservation of "minerals"
absent a showing of an intent to the contrary." Once ownership of the
substance was ascertained, the majority in Reed stated that such a construction of the instrument controlled title to that substance at any
depth. 5 Furthermore, it was immaterial that reclamation techniques were
available or contemplated if the method of extraction necessitated the
stripping away of the surface soil.2" The concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Greenhill, however, advocated a less difficult burden of proof in light of
the Acker decision, maintaining that the surface owner need only show
that "any reasonable method of production would have destroyed or depleted the surface estate.""7
The dissent in Reed by Justice Daniel criticized the majority for placing
an unreasonable burden of proof on the surface owner with regard to
near-surface substances. 8 Daniel reasoned that the decisive factor in
Acker was the physical proximity of the substance to the surface, and
that further, the Acker opinion had made no requirement of proof that
removal of the substance on the date of the instrument would have impaired the surface of the land."
The increasing demand for energy coupled with the diminishing supply
of oil and gas has renewed national interest in coal as an alternative domes21. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
22. Id. at 174 (concurring opinion).
23. Id. at 172.
24. Id. at 172; see Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
25. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977).
26. Id. at 172; see Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975,
no writ).
27. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1977) (concurring opinion).
28. Id. at 181 (dissenting opinion).
29. Id. at 181 (dissenting opinion). While acknowledging that the surface destruction test
of Acker v. Guinn should be affirmed, the dissenting justices concluded that it should not be
extended to require the surface owner to prove that surface mining was the only method of
extracting a near surface substance at the time of the deed. Id. at 174-75 (dissenting opinion).
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tic fuel.1 Lignite coal is rapidly becoming a major energy source in Texas,
and presently about eight to ten million tons of it are produced in this state
each year.' Deposits of lignite are generally located in east Texas along the
Texas coastal plain, in the Wilcox Group north of the Colorado River, and
near Freestone County in central Texas.3" Surveys and geological findings
estimate the extent of near-surface deposits at 3.3 billion short tons,
most of which is located at a depth of ninety feet or less.Y Today, all of
the lignite produced in Texas is strip mined, and the extent of recovery
is estimated at eighty to eighty-five percent.3 '
Lignite coal has not been utilized in the past primarily because of the
adverse environmental effects of surface mining." In 1975, however, the
Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act was passed by the Texas
Legislature. The legislative intent behind this enactment is to promote
the extraction of mineral resources by surface mining, and to assure the
restoration of affected land through subsequent reclamation. 7 Moreover,
the specific reclamation standards which must be observed by operators
38
are enumerated in section 11 of the Act.
30. See Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or"Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other
Minerals?", 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 481 (1976).
31. Lampkin, A Texas Comparisonof the Coal Lease with the Oil and Gas Lease, 16 S.
TEX. L.J. 309, 309 (1975).
32. See Meroney, Title to and Leasing of Coal and Lignite in Texas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 77, 78-80 (1977).

33. Id. at 78-79. A "short ton" is a unit of measure equal to twenty short hundredweight
or 2000 pounds, and is used primarily in the United States. It can be distinguished from the
English "long ton" which is equal to 2240 pounds. I. AslMOv, REALM OF MEASURE 88-89 (1960).
34. Meroney, Title to and Leasing of Coal and Lignite in Texas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 77, 80-81 (1977).
35. See Comment, The Common Law Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface.
Preservation, 38 Mo. L. REV. 234, 246 (1973). Already two million acres of land stand
unreclaimed in the United States after being strip mined of nearly four and one-half billion
tons of coal.
36. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). The require.
ments of the Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act apply to all surface mining operations which have commenced since its enactment on June 21, 1975. Id. § 5(2). To obtain a
permit to engage in strip mining, an operator must submit a proposed reclamation plan and
execute a performance bond to secure the cost of such reclamation. Id. §§ 10, 14. Permits for
the surface mining of coal and lignite are issued for a term not to exceed five years. Id. § 8(b).
See generally Comment, Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act-New Hope for Protection of Texas Resources, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 850, 855-63 (1976).
37. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). Prior to
passage of the Act, the only reclamation requirements which existed in Texas were those
agreed upon by the parties in their lease agreement. See Meroney, Title to and Leasing of

Coal and Lignite in Texas, PROCEEDINGS
77, 99 (1977).

OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND

GAS LAW AND TAXATION

38. Basically, the Act requires that the land be restored to substantially the same condition it was in prior to the mining operation. It must be graded to its original contour, and
the topsoil must be restored. Revegetation must be commenced upon cessation of mining
operations, and continued for a period of four years. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10,
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North Dakota enacted a similar state reclamation statute in 1969.11
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of North Dakota, in Christman v.
Emineth,10 was presented with the identical question decided in Reed. In
Christmanthe defendant held title to fifty percent of all "oil, gas and other
minerals" in and under certain real property, together with the right of
reasonable surface use to explore and produce such minerals. The plaintiff
contended that lignite coal was not included in the reservation of minerals,
and that it constituted part of the surface estate.4 In construing the reservation, the court ruled that the term "other minerals" included lignite
coal, 2 and the defendant was entitled to use so much of the surface as was
reasonably necessary to remove the substance.' 3 The court noted that lignite coal had been known to exist in the area, and that strip mining was
the best method of producing it at the time the instrument was executed."
Although it was forcefully argued that strip mining of the substance would
destroy the surface for agricultural purposes, the Christman court held
that compliance with the state reclamation statute would result in restoration of the surface temporarily damaged by surface mining. 5 The majority
in Reed, however, maintained that it was immaterial that methods of
restoration and reclamation were available to restore the surface after strip
mining.'" Thus, the Reed opinion appears inconsistent with current legislative policy which promotes surface mining of natural resources and seeks
§ 11 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). Texas may have to revise its state reclamation statute in
accordance with the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, if it wishes to continue to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface
coal mining and reclamation operations on non-Federal lands within the state. See Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 503, 91 Stat. 445, 470
(1977).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14 (1972).
40. 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
41. Id. at 547.
42. Id. at 548-49; see Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844, 856 (N.D. 1972); Adams County
v. Smith, 23 N.W.2d 873, 875 (N.D. 1946). But see Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex.
1977) (dissenting opinion) (majority of jurisdictions hold coal not included in reservation of
"other minerals").
43. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D. 1973); cf. Kenny v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ refd) (reasonable use
includes production of minerals by means of only available method, regardless of surface
damage).
44. Compare Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D. 1973) with Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 178 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
45. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550-51 (N.D. 1973); see Reiss v. Rummel,
232 N.W.2d 40, 44-45 (N.D. 1975); Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1975); cf.
Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Ky. 1968) (rejected surface
destruction argument, although not expressly on basis of Kentucky reclamation statute). But
see Wulf v. Schultz, 508 P.2d 896, 900 (Kan. 1973).
46. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977); see Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d
127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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to provide adequate protection for the surface owner.' 7
Whereas Christman treated ownership of minerals and the right of extraction by surface mining as independent issues, the court in Reed declared that a substance is owned by the surface owner if it can only be
removed by substantial destruction to the surface." It is well settled that
a mineral owner has the right to use as much of the surface as is reasonably
necessary to produce minerals and effectuate the purpose of the grant." As
long as his operation is conducted with due regard for the rights of the
surface estate, the mineral owner will not be liable for resulting damage
to the surface in the absence of negligence," or a contract to pay for such
surface damage.' In Getty Oil Co. v.Jones" the Texas Supreme Court
attempted to balance the policy favoring development of the surface for
agricultural purposes against the policy of encouraging mineral exploration. 3 With reference to its prior holding in Acker, the majority in Getty
observed that destruction of the surface for agricultural purposes by the
mineral owner was not ordinarily contemplated as being within the scope
of reasonable use of the surface for the production of minerals.2 ' The court
reasoned that where only one manner of surface use could be implemented
to produce minerals, the mineral owner had the right to pursue such use
regardless of surface damage.2 5 Conversely, if the mineral owner had a
reasonable alternative method of production, the rule of reasonable use
would require utilization of that technique rather than cause injury to the
surface."
47. See Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uraniumand Coal by Surface Methods.: Acker
v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. Rav. 451, 471-72 (1976).

48. Compare Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1975) and Christman v.
Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549-50 (N.D. 1973) with Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex.
1977) and Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).

49. E.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967); General
Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1961); Warren Petroleum
Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 481, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (1957).

50. Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, 435 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 86, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (1961).
51. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134-35 (Tex. 1967); Meyer v.
Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ refd).

52. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
53. Id. at 622-23. In Getty the surface owner brought an action to enjoin an oil and gas
lessee from using two beam-type pumping units, one of which was seventeen feet high at the
top of its upstroke, and the other thirty-four feet in height. The vertical space required for
the pumping units interfered with the surface owner's use of an automatic irrigation sprinkler
system, resulting in a devaluation of the land for agricultural production. The court held that
Getty's use of the surface was unreasonable because of the availability of non-interfering
pumping units as a reasonable alternative method of production. Id. at 622-23.
54. Id. at 622. Compare Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) with
Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
55. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971); see Kenny v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ refd).

56. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971). The accommodation of
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Under the accommodation of estates approach announced in Getty, it
could be argued that strip mining is within the mineral owner's right to a
reasonable and necessary use of the surface where there is no alternative
means of removal available." The court in Reed, however, restricted the
definition of minerals to those substances which can be extracted without
substantial destruction of the surface." Rather than limit surface use by
the dominant mineral estate, the Reed opinion allows the surface estate
to retain part of what was traditionally granted or reserved to the mineral
estate in an effort to protect the surface estate from damage due to surface
mining. 9
The distinguishing factor between the Reed and Acker decisions is the
burden of proof requirement which has been imposed on the surface
owner.6 0 Whereas Acker ruled that a substance which can be extracted only
by substantial depletion of the surface belongs to the surface owner, the
majority in Reed maintained that such a construction would not be applicable unless the surface owner proved that surface mining of the substance, at the time the instrument was executed, would have destroyed the
surface estate.' Traditionally, the intention of the parties to a conveyance
has been objectively determined from the language used in the instrument
in the absence of an ambiguity. 2 The Reed court, however, had adopted a
subjective standard, conditioning title to minerals upon evidence of production methods and facts which existed at the time of the deed's execution. 1 This burden could be onerous, especially with regard to extremely
old deeds and leases.6 ' In the future, title to specific minerals under a
estates doctrine established in Getty has been applied in several Texas cases. See Humble
Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. 1974); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d
808, 817 (Tex. 1972) (dissenting opinion). See generally Smith, Oil and Gas, 29 Sw. L.J. 109,
111 (1975).
57. See Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other
Minerals?", 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 498 (1976).
58. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977); see Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348,
352 (Tex. 1971).
59. See Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other
Minerals?", 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 499-500 (1976).
60. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977).
61. Compare Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) with Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
62. E.g., Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d
800, 805 (1940); Colquitt v. Eureka Producing Co., 63 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1933, judgmt adopted); Chandler v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971,
writ refd n.r.e.).

63. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 182 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion). Although there
was evidence of shaft mining for lignite in Freestone County prior to 1950, the majority in
Reed maintained that this was immaterial if removal of the.near-surface lignite in 1950 would
have destroyed the land surface. Id. at 173.
64. Id. at 181. In his analysis of oil and gas law in Wyoming, Professor Eugene Kuntz
stated:
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general grant or reservation will be established on a case by case basis,
depending upon expert testimony and jury determinations as to facts
which existed at the date of the deed's execution.u Consequently, the test
promulgated by the majority in Reed may create uncertainty in Texas land
titles, notably where ownership of lignite coal is concerned."
One commentator has proposed an alternative view which permits a
mineral owner to strip mine near-surface substances, but only in the event
he compensates the surface owner for the damage to the surface estate.,
If, however, the instrument specifically reserves a substance and the
method of extraction, the mineral owner would not be liable for surface
damage resulting from the mining operation."5
No other matter better illustrates the conflict between America's need
for new sources of energy and the environmental impact entailed in securing such resources than that of strip mining. Due to the extensive lignite
deposits in Texas and the increasing use of those deposits within the state,
ownership of coal and lignite will continue to be an issue of serious litigation in the future. Although the Texas Supreme Court in Reed purported
to reaffirm its decision in Acker, it has adopted a more conservative approach by imposing a heavy burden on the surface owner which must be
met before a near-surface substance will be excluded from a grant or
reservation of minerals." In so doing, Reed affords greater protection for
In matters of land titles, and most certainly in the field of oil and gas where heavy
expenditures of capital are incident to exploration, development and production, certainty is of the utmost importance. A rule which requires consideration of the contemporaneous factual or legal setting would create the impossible situation of requiring
the title examiner to inquire into the. local folk-lore of the area or of requiring the
examiner to retain a catalogued knowledge of the law as to dates of development. In
either event, he could never be confident of his conclusion.
Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949).
65. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 182 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
66. Wylie argued that a mineral owner should be vested with title to all minerals, subject
to reasonable use of the surface for production. The majority in Reed rejected Wylie's contention that such a rule would provide more certainty in matters of land titles and mineral
ownership. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. 1977); see Kuntz, The Law Relating to
Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949) (policy favoring production is enhanced
by rule which makes title to minerals most certain).
67. See Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 115
(1949). Professor Kuntz argues that a conveyance or reservation of minerals severs the entire
mineral estate from the surface estate, including near surface substances. Id. at 112. Although
the mineral owner is entitled to reasonable use of the surface estate, surface mining is an
unreasonable use and the surface owner is entitled to compensation for his injury. Id. at 115;
cf. Smith v. Moore, 474 P.2d 794, 795-96 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (in absence of an express
provision to the contrary, strip mining without compensation would be an uncontemplated
burden on the surface estate). But see Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395,
399 (Ky. 1968). See also Comment, Surface or Mineral: A Single Test?, 23 BAYLoR L. Rv.
407, 416 (1971).
68. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 115 (1949).
69. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977).
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